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Abstract: 
We examine households’ applications to and participation in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program using administrative records from South Carolina. We model application 
resolutions with multinomial logit (MNL) specifications where the possible outcomes are 
acceptance, denial due to income ineligibility, denial due to a failure to provide sufficient 
information and denial due to other reasons. For cases with successful applications, we model the 
durations of participation spells using competing risk hazard specifications that distinguish 
among exits that result from missed recertifications, financial ineligibility, incomplete or missing 
information and other reasons. The application and hazard outcomes depend on past programme 
behaviour and observed characteristics. The results indicate that a household’s application and 
participation history affect its subsequent application success and programme tenure. 
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Article: 
I. Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is intended to help low-income people 
obtain more nutritious diets than they could otherwise afford.1 In order for the SNAP to fulfil this 
vital objective, eligible people must enrol and participate in the programme. Regrettably, many 
eligible people do not take-up benefits. Eslami et al. (2012) estimated that only 75% of people 
who were eligible to receive SNAP benefits in fiscal year 2010 actually participated. The 
incomplete take-up of SNAP (and other assistance programme) benefits is an important concern 
for policymakers and has motivated many research studies (see Currie, 2004). 
Participation in the SNAP involves two distinct sets of processes, namely entry into the 
programme and continuation in the programme. Only a subset of SNAP studies consider 
programme entry separately from programme continuation and exit, and even fewer studies 
consider these processes in any programmatic detail. For example, Bartlett et al.(2004), 
Daponte et al. (1999) and Heflin et al. (2012) examined how different policies and actions 
affected households decisions to apply to the SNAP, but no study has examined how applications 
are resolved – that is, whether applications are accepted or rejected. Our understanding of 
programme continuation and exit is better. Ribaret al. (2008, 2010) and Staveley et al. (2002) 
found that SNAP exits occur mainly at recertification due dates (times when people have to 
reapply for benefits). Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) found that exits due to missed recertifications 
and documentation problems accounted for two thirds of the SNAP exits. However, none of 
these studies accounted for SNAP spells being selected from successful applications. 
We address these gaps by investigating potential SNAP cases at the time they apply and 
examining the resolution of those applications. Among households with successful applications, 
we then examine how long the subsequent participation spells last and the reasons why those 
spells end. We investigate these issues using case management records for households with 
children from South Carolina (SC), from October 1996 until November 2007. 
Our principal analyses use these data to estimate joint multivariate models of SNAP application 
resolutions and subsequent participation spells. Jointly modelling these processes allows for the 
possibility that successful applications constitute a nonrandom sample of all applications. The 
model of application resolutions distinguishes among applications that were accepted, denied 
because of financial ineligibility, denied because of a failure to provide sufficient information or 
denied or withdrawn for other reasons. We consider the roles that past application and 
programme behaviour play in these outcomes. For households with successful applications, we 
model the durations of the resulting participation spells using a competing risk hazard framework 
that distinguishes among programme exits that occur because of missed recertifications, financial 
ineligibility, incomplete or missing information and other reasons. As with the application 
outcomes, we also consider how previous application and programme experiences affect 
programme spells. 
The estimates from our analyses reveal that households’ SNAP application and participation 
experiences are predictive of their subsequent experiences. For example, SNAP applicants who 
have recently completed a participation spell are more likely to be successful with their 
applications than those who have not recently participated. Among the applicants who do have 
recent programme experience, however, the way in which their previous spell ended helps to 
predict the reasons why their application might be denied and why their next participation spell 
ends. For example, applicants face an increased risk of having their application denied for 
financial ineligibility or having a SNAP participation spell end for financial ineligibility if an 
earlier participation spell ended for that reason. These findings may be valuable especially to 
programme managers and caseworkers because they all involve characteristics that can be 
ascertained from case files. 
II. Background 
SNAP participation is determined by a series of processes and events. As a first step, a needy 
household must apply for benefits, which usually entails completing an application and 
providing supporting documentation. Once an application is submitted, the state agency that 
administers the SNAP reviews it and often requires an in-person interview. The state agency then 
determines whether the household qualifies for benefits and can participate. If the application is 
rejected because of incomplete information or another procedural reason, the household may 
reapply. If the household is rejected because of ineligibility, it may reapply if the household’s 
circumstances change. If the application is approved, the household begins participating and 
receiving benefits. Thereafter, the household must follow the programme’s rules and remain 
eligible to continue receiving benefits. If the household stops complying with the programme 
rules, decides to stop receiving benefits or loses eligibility because of a change in its economic 
circumstances or living arrangements, the household’s case is closed, and it returns to the pool of 
nonapplicants. 
Although the general structure of these processes is common across the United States, many 
specific features vary from place to place. The federal and state governments are partners in the 
SNAP, with the federal government setting general rules, paying the full cost of benefits and 
paying about half of state administrative costs and with the states administering the programme. 
In their role as administrators, states have latitude in a number of areas including establishing 
and running SNAP offices, developing and reviewing initial applications and setting 
recertification intervals. This administrative flexibility allows states to tailor parts of the SNAP 
to fit with local objectives and circumstances, but it also has implications for take-up behaviour. 
Currie (2004) has reviewed research on the take-up of public assistance programmes and has 
grouped the explanations for incomplete take-up into three general categories. First, households 
are unlikely to participate in programmes if they lack information about the programmes or their 
own eligibility. For example, Daponte et al.(1999) conducted a random-assignment field 
experiment with food pantry clients who were financially eligible for SNAP but not participating 
in the programme. They found that giving households information about their eligibility 
increased their likelihood of applying. Second, as Moffitt (1983) proposed, stigma associated 
with programme receipt might impose psychic costs on households that reduce their 
participation. Third, households may be deterred from participating due to the time and hassle 
associated with the administrative procedures. 
Some of these explanations are more relevant for some SNAP processes than for others. Stigma 
might be a factor in households’ initial decisions to apply for the SNAP but seems less likely to 
influence their continuation behaviour. Similarly, information might be a barrier to households’ 
application and initial participation behaviour; however, information should increase as 
participation continues. Some types of administrative procedures, such as complicated 
application forms or initial document requirements, would be relevant when households enter the 
SNAP, while other procedures, such as recertification and income reporting requirements, would 
be relevant for programme continuation. 
Little of this structure is reflected in SNAP caseload research. Many caseload studies simply 
examine the incidence of programme participation, by modelling either the aggregate number of 
people or households receiving benefits (Wallace and Blank, 1999; Wilde et al., 2000; 
Kornfeld, 2002; Kabbani and Wilde, 2003; Ziliak et al., 2003; Mabli and Ferrerosa, 2010; 
Klerman and Danielson, 2011) or the incidence of receipt among individual households (Fraker 
and Moffitt, 1988; Keane and Moffitt, 1998; Currie and Grogger, 2001; Farrell et al., 2003; 
Haider et al., 2003; Huffman and Jensen, 2005; Hanratty, 2006; Ratcliffe et al., 2008). Other 
research considers programme entry separately from programme exit but examines these 
processes as simple bivariate outcomes (Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Gleason et al., 1998; Mills et 
al., 2001; Staveley et al., 2002; Cody et al., 2005; Ribar et al., 2008, 2010; Mabli et al., 2011). 
Only a few studies have carefully investigated component processes. Bartlett et al. (2004) 
documented policies and practices in local SNAP offices, measured perceptions of these policies 
and practices among households that appeared to be eligible for assistance and examined how 
these perceptions affected participation behaviour. They found that many nonparticipating 
households believed themselves to be ineligible and that many households had misperceptions 
about programme rules. They further found that the operating hours of the programme offices, 
positive attitudes of office supervisors, fingerprinting of clients, arrangements for children while 
parents applied and the time limits for able-bodied adults without dependents affected people’s 
chances of completing the applications. 
Heflin et al. (2012) interviewed Florida SNAP applicants following that state’s switch to an 
Internet- and call-centre-based application system. Although some applicants liked the switch, 
others complained about problems reaching the call centres, difficulties submitting documents 
electronically and a general lack of help with applications. 
Using programme records from SC, Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) investigated the reasons why 
people left the SNAP. They found that half of the exits were associated with missed 
recertifications and that another sixth were associated with problems in supplying information. 
Some of these ‘paperwork’ exits occurred among households that were likely to be found 
ineligible; however, exits also occurred among households in very unstable and distressed 
circumstances. 
Our article extends these studies. As with the studies by Bartlett et al. (2004) and Heflin et 
al. (2012), we carefully examine SNAP application behaviour but additionally consider how 
applications are resolved. In particular, we examine whether applications are approved or 
rejected for financial ineligibility, incomplete information or other reasons. As with the study by 
Ribar and Edelhoch (2008), we also use administrative data to examine participants’ programme 
spells and reasons for exiting the SNAP. We extend these earlier studies, however, by modelling 
application and subsequent participation behaviour jointly and by examining how earlier 
application and participation outcomes affect subsequent outcomes. 
III. Data 
The data for our empirical analyses come from SNAP case management records from SC, 
covering the period from October 1996 until November 2007. The records contain a wealth of 
information, including the dates and resolutions of applications, the dates of participation spells, 
demographic characteristics of households, geographic identifiers and benefit and reported 
income amounts during each month of programme receipt. We use these records to form an 
analysis file with observations of (1) applications and their resolutions and (2) participation 
spells for the approved applications. 
Due to the vast number of SC SNAP cases, we reduced the analysis extract by initially drawing a 
1-in-11 random sample of longitudinal cases. Cases are groups of people, typically households, 
that together receive SNAP benefits. SC constructs internal identifiers that allow such cases to be 
tracked over time, including across different episodes of application and benefit receipt. Thus, 
our extract represents a random sample of available histories, including all of the applications 
and programme spells associated with a household over the study period. 
We make three additional restrictions to the data. First, we limit the analysis to households where 
children are present at the time of application and in which the case head was between the age of 
18 and 59 and no other adults were over the age of 59.2 Second, we drop observations with 
missing, incomplete or inconsistent information about participation, household characteristics or 
case head characteristics. In terms of the longitudinal case histories, we right censor the history 
at the first instance of problematic data. Third, we drop observations from a case’s longitudinal 
history if there is a change in the identified case head, a procedure that also right censors the 
longitudinal history. Our final data set contains 50 826 SNAP applications and 35 448 spells 
(466 258 months) of benefit receipt. 
The application approval rate in our sample is 70%. For every application that is denied or 
withdrawn, the administrative records give a reason. There are 29 detailed codes that are used at 
least once in our records. We grouped the codes into three broad categories based on the denials 
because of 
 ineligibility because the household’s income or assets were too high, 
 failure to provide information or verifiable information and 
 other reasons, including voluntary withdrawal. 
The detailed codes and frequencies are reported in Ribar and Swann (2011, Appendix A). 
From the accepted applications, we examine the subsequent spells of SNAP participation, which 
we measure in discrete, monthly intervals. SC SNAP spells can begin anytime during a month. 
However, once a spell begins, benefits are only paid once a month. Also, when a case is 
terminated, the official closing date occurs at the end of the month. 
Our data begin in October 1996. However, because our multivariate models condition on 
application and programme experience during the preceding year, our analysis begins in October 
1997. We drop spells that are ongoing in October 1997 and only consider applications and new 
spells that begin on or after this date. The spells themselves should refer to continuous months of 
benefit receipt; however, some records sometimes contain short breaks. We smooth the 
information by combining spells of programme participation that are separated by a month or 
less to eliminate artificial transitions associated with administrative churning. This treatment is 
consistent with the state policies that consider programme spells that resume within 1 month of a 
previous spell to be continuations of the earlier spells. 
As with denied applications, the administrative records give a reason for closure of each case. 
There are 33 detailed codes that are used at least once in our records. We grouped the codes into 
four broad categories based on the cases that ended because the household 
 missed its recertification, 
 lost eligibility as its income or assets were too high, 
 failed to provide information or provide reliable information or 
 lost eligibility because of some other reason or voluntarily quit. 
The detailed codes and frequencies are reported in Ribar and Swann (2011, Appendix B). 
The longitudinal identifiers in the data allow us to link applications and programme spells over 
time and control for households’ application and participation histories. To account for the past 
experience with the SNAP, we construct variables indicating whether the household applied 
within the past year and, if there was an application, the outcome and the number of months 
since the application. Additionally, we construct variables measuring the number of months since 
the most recent spell closure (if it occurred within the past year) and the reason for the closure. 
From the information on demographic characteristics, we construct measures of the number and 
age composition of the case members. We also construct variables for the age, sex, race, 
educational attainment, and marital status of the household member heading the case. 
Unlike the demographic characteristics, data on income and earnings are not available for denied 
applications. Consequently, we merge in quarterly earnings data from SC’s Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) system. The UI database contains earnings information for most private, 
nonagricultural employers. However, it misses some jobs (e.g., agricultural and domestic work) 
and misses employment by people who work out of state. 
For each month of SNAP participation, the records indicate the benefits that the household 
received and the information that enters the benefit calculation, including gross reported earned 
and unearned income amounts. We use these variables in our analyses, adjusting all dollar 
amounts to 2005 levels using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. 
The records also indicate the county of residence for the household, which allows us to link the 
records to measures of the county unemployment rate and population density. SC also delegates 
much of the day-to-day administration of its SNAP to counties. To account for the differences in 
operational procedures across counties and other geographic differences, the multivariate 
analyses include dummy variables for each county. 
Several SC SNAP policies changed during the observation period of our study. One set of 
policies involved the recertification intervals for different types of cases. Prior to October 2002, 
cases with variable incomes (usually earnings) had to recertify their eligibility quarterly, while 
cases with fixed incomes such as welfare, disability payments, or retirement had to recertify 
annually. Starting in October 2002, SC increased the recertification intervals for cases with 
variable earnings to 6 months; and starting in February 2005, it reduced the recertification 
intervals for households with fixed incomes to 6 months. Our multivariate analyses of 
participation spells include controls for these policies. SC changed several other policies, such as 
exempting all vehicles from the calculation of household assets in fiscal year 2002 and adopting 
simplified income reporting requirements and definitions of income. To account for these and 
other changes, the multivariate analyses include general sets of time controls. 
Table 1 lists means of the income, programme history, head, household and geographic 
contextual variables calculated conditionally depending on different application outcomes. Table 
2 lists means of characteristics of SNAP participation spells that ended for different reasons or 
that were right censored. 
Table 1. Means of applicant characteristics by application outcome 
  Approved Income or 
assets too 
high 
Failed to 
provide 
information 
Other 
denial/voluntary 
withdrawal 
Case income         
 UI earnings 660.6 1225.2** 409.4** 663.5 
 UI earnings 
missing (%) 
35.1 36.3 66.9** 56.7** 
Previous year 
programme history 
        
 Spell closure in 
past year (%) 
30.9 20.3** 26.1** 17.9** 
 Months since 
closure, if positive 
5.1 5.9** 5.4** 5.7** 
 Spell closed for 
certification (%) 
16.5 9.4** 14.7** 8.7** 
 Spell closed for 
income (%) 
6.2 7.9** 4.0** 3.5** 
 Spell closed for 
information (%) 
5.5 2.3** 5.1 2.9** 
 Spell closed for 
other/voluntary (%) 
2.7 0.8** 2.3* 2.7 
 Denial in past year 
(%) 
14.6 14.3 17.4** 14.5 
 Months since 
denial, if positive 
4.5 5.0** 5.1** 4.7 
 App. denied for 
income (%) 
3.5 7.2** 3.3 3.9 
 App. denied for 
information (%) 
8.4 6.3** 11.7** 7.8 
 App. denied for 2.7 0.8** 2.3* 2.7 
other/voluntary (%) 
Head, household 
characteristics 
        
 Female (%) 91.9 90.1** 92.2 91.7 
 Age 31.9 33.5** 30.1** 30.7** 
 Education 11.4 11.6** 11.2** 11.1** 
 Currently married 
(%) 
21.7 33.4** 21.5 23.0 
 Formerly married 
(%) 
32.1 28.4** 26.0** 24.0** 
 Black (%) 55.8 58.5** 55.1 58.9** 
 Other race (%) 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 
 Number of 
children 
2.0 1.9** 1.8** 1.7** 
 Number of adults 1.5 1.7** 1.5** 1.5** 
Geographic 
characteristics 
        
 County 
unemployment rate 
6.0 5.9 5.5** 5.9 
 County population 
density 
2.1 2.1 2.2** 2.1 
Number of 
applications 
35 448 4885 8352 2142 
Notes: UI: Unemployment Insurance; App.: application; SC: South Carolina. Authors’ 
calculations from SC administrative records. The asterisks indicate significant differences 
between means of applicant characteristics whose applications were approved from those whose 
applications were not. 
*Differences significant at 0.05 level. 
**Differences are significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics at spell end by reason for exit 
  Missed 
recertification 
Income or 
assets too 
high 
Failed to 
provide 
information 
Other loss 
of elig. or 
vol. exit 
Censored 
spell 
Case income and 
benefits 
          
 Benefits 262.2** 231.9** 305.3 299.1 305.2 
 Reported 
earned income 
600.8** 736.3** 325.5** 292.2** 446.3 
 Reported 
unearned income 
271.3 350.7** 268.5 283.6 275.0 
 Any earnings 
start of spell (%) 
52.8** 59.0** 37.7** 30.8** 45.5 
 No income start 
of spell (%) 
18.6** 12.6** 29.9** 33.9** 22.5 
Previous year 
programme 
history 
          
 Months since 
closure if pos. 
5.2** 5.3** 5.0 5.2* 5.0 
 Spell closed for 
certification (%) 
19.2 10.4** 15.8** 12.0** 18.1 
 Spell closed for 
income (%) 
4.8** 11.3** 4.5** 4.2** 7.0 
 Spell closed for 
information (%) 
5.8 4.1** 7.4** 4.4** 5.3 
 Spell closed for 
other/vol. (%) 
2.5 1.5** 3.0 5.5** 2.5 
 Months since 
denial if positive 
4.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 
 App. denied for 3.1* 6.4** 3.1* 2.3** 3.8 
income (%) 
 App. denied for 
information (%) 
10.0** 6.8** 10.0** 7.7 8.1 
 App. denied for 
other/vol. (%) 
2.5 1.5** 3.0 5.5** 2.5 
 Duration 
(months) 
11.5** 10.9** 11.0** 10.4** 21.6 
Head, household 
characteristics 
          
 Female (%) 91.6** 92.0* 91.4** 91.7** 92.9 
 Age 32.6** 34.5** 31.5** 32.2** 33.8 
 Education 11.5** 11.8** 11.4** 11.3** 11.6 
 Currently 
married (%) 
21.9** 28.9** 19.5** 20.5** 16.9 
 Formerly 
married (%) 
34.0** 31.0 33.8* 37.1** 32.0 
 Black (%) 54.2** 62.7** 53.7** 48.2** 58.6 
 Other race (%) 1.8** 1.3** 1.4** 2.6** 0.6 
 Number of 
children 
2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
 Number of 
adults 
1.5 1.6** 1.5** 1.5** 1.5 
Geographic 
characteristics 
          
 County 
unemployment 
rate 
5.9** 6.3** 6.0** 6.2** 6.4 
 County 
population density 
2.1** 2.0** 2.2** 2.0** 2.3 
Number of exits 15 085 5604 4728 3201 6830 
Notes: App.: application; SC: South Carolina; elig.: eligibility; vol.: voluntary withdrawal. 
Authors’ calculations from SC administrative records. The asterisks indicate significant 
differences between means in characteristics of participants whose spells were censored from 
those whose spells terminated. 
*Differences significant at 0.05 level. 
**Differences significant at 0.01 level. 
 
IV. Multivariate Models 
To isolate the independent influences of the different characteristics on programme outcomes, 
we jointly estimate the multivariate models of SNAP application resolutions and of subsequent 
participation behaviour. We specify the model of application resolution outcomes as a 
multinomial logit (MNL). Let pj(t) be the probability of resolution outcome j for an application 
made by a household at time t, where the outcomes include the application being accepted 
(j = 0), denied for financial ineligibility (j = 1), denied for a failure to provide information (j = 2) 
and denied for other reasons (j = 3). We assume that the resolution probability depends on a set 
of observed and possibly time-varying characteristics, X(t), and a time-invariant unobserved 
household characteristic, η. Because we are estimating probabilities of resolution, actual 
resolution outcomes also depend on additional time-varying unobserved characteristics. We 
model the probability for the application resolution as: 
 
(1) 
where δj and πj are sets of parameters to be estimated. 
Conditional on an application being approved, we observe a participation spell. We estimate a 
discrete time, competing risk hazard model (Allison, 1982) of four types of SNAP exits, namely 
missed recertifications, loss of eligibility for income or resource reasons, failure to provide 
information and all other reasons. Let hk(t) be the hazard of the household leaving the SNAP for 
reason k (= 1, 4), which depends on the duration of the spell, T(t), as well as other observed and 
unobserved characteristics such that 
 
(2) 
where , , and  represent sets of parameters to be estimated. 
The application resolution and participation models are estimated jointly. Besides the observed 
explanatory variables, the models share an unobserved component, η, which allows for 
correlations across the models and for serial correlation in the unobserved determinants of the 
models. In this way, we simultaneously account for selection from unobservables in application 
outcomes and for spurious duration dependence from unobservables in the participation analysis. 
We assume that η follows a discrete distribution with a finite number of potential outcomes and 
estimate the points of support and probabilities for this distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). 
Coefficient estimates from our principal specification for application resolutions are given 
in Table 3, and coefficient estimates from our principal specification for programme spells are 
given in Table 4. As the row headings in the tables indicate, the explanatory variables in the 
application and competing risk hazard models include measures of household economic 
resources, household demographic characteristics and local economic and population 
characteristics. The competing risk models of programme tenures also include controls for SNAP 
benefits and quarterly, semi-annual and annual spell duration indicators that correspond to the 
likely ends of the certification periods. In addition to these measures, the models include other 
explanatory measures and controls, although we do not report detailed results.3 In particular, our 
application and programme tenure models include dummy variable controls for the applicant’s 
county of residence and for the fiscal year of the observation. The competing risk models of 
programme tenure also include 36 monthly dummy variables that cover the first 3 years of a spell 
duration and four semi-annual dummy variables that cover the next 2 years. The models are 
estimated using a discrete distribution for the unobserved component, η, with four points of 
support. Specification tests support the inclusion of county and fiscal year fixed effects, general 
controls for the baseline duration pattern and the control for a common unobserved component. 
Table 3. MNL application model results 
  Income or assets 
too high 
Failed to provide 
information 
Other denial/vol. 
withdrawal 
Case income       
 UI earnings 0.098** (0.003) 0.039** (0.003) 0.074** (0.004) 
 UI earnings missing 1.399** (0.058) 1.892** (0.046) 1.762** (0.074) 
Previous year programme 
history 
      
 Months since closure 0.078** (0.012) 0.026** (0.009) 0.065** (0.018) 
 Spell closed for 
certification 
−0.934** (0.094) −0.189** (0.062) −0.958** (0.128) 
 Spell closed for income −0.524** (0.099) −0.180* (0.081) −0.848** (0.172) 
 Spell closed for 
information 
−1.184** (0.128) −0.175* (0.080) −1.010** (0.167) 
 Spell closed for 
other/voluntary 
−1.604** (0.200) −0.312** (0.107) −0.520** (0.182) 
 Months since denial 0.025 (0.015) 0.052** (0.011) 0.001 (0.020) 
 App. denied for income 0.182 (0.110) −0.017 (0.092) 0.116 (0.158) 
 App. denied for 
information 
−0.213* (0.101) −0.147* (0.072) −0.201 (0.130) 
 App. denied for 
other/voluntary 
−0.461** (0.157) −0.492** (0.115) 0.199 (0.154) 
Head, household 
characteristics 
      
 Female 0.089 (0.061) −0.037 (0.052) 0.109 (0.086) 
 Age spline, 18–21 years 0.100* (0.043) −0.156** (0.024) −0.378** (0.035) 
 Age spline, 22–40 years −0.001 (0.004) −0.041** (0.003) −0.029** (0.006) 
 Age spline, 41+ years 0.009 (0.007) −0.004 (0.006) 0.049** (0.009) 
 Education spline, 0–
12 years 
−0.082** (0.014) −0.030** (0.010) −0.062** (0.016) 
 Education spline, 12+ 
years 
−0.007 (0.034) −0.076* (0.030) −0.070 (0.053) 
 Completed high school 0.576** (0.058) 0.171** (0.041) 0.156 (0.069) 
 Completed college −0.121 (0.208) −0.029 (0.190) 0.233 (0.311) 
 Currently married 0.312** (0.052) 0.092* (0.042) 0.008 (0.073) 
 Formerly married 0.051 (0.047) −0.156** (0.038) −0.199** (0.067) 
 Black 0.242** (0.043) 0.027 (0.033) 0.212** (0.058) 
 Other race −0.103 (0.151) −0.349** (0.115) −0.134 (0.183) 
 Number of children 0–2 −0.352** (0.037) −0.290** (0.028) −0.355** (0.053) 
 Number of children 3–5 −0.264** (0.033) −0.198** (0.026) −0.266** (0.049) 
 Number of children 6–11 −0.255** (0.025) −0.165** (0.019) −0.224** (0.036) 
 Number of children 12–
14 
−0.186** (0.035) −0.083* (0.029) −0.203** (0.053) 
 Number of children 15–
17 
−0.245** (0.039) 0.027 (0.031) −0.096 (0.058) 
 Number of adults 0.159** (0.025) 0.238** (0.020) 0.099** (0.036) 
Geographic characteristics       
 County unemployment 
rate 
0.021 (0.019) −0.024 (0.016) −0.090** (0.026) 
 County population 
density 
−0.428* (0.194) −0.753** (0.158) −0.477 (0.272) 
πi (coefficients on 
unobserved factor, η) 
−0.521** (0.124) 0.529** (0.086) −0.023 (0.135) 
Notes: SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; UI: Unemployment Insurance; 
Appl.: application; SC: South Carolina; vol.: voluntary. The columns report estimated 
coefficients from a MNL model of application resolutions that was estimated jointly with a 
competing risk hazard model of SNAP exits, using SC administrative records. In addition to the 
listed controls, the application resolution model included controls for fiscal year and county of 
residence. Huber–White SEs appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
**Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 4. Competing risk SNAP exit hazard model results 
  Missed 
recertification 
Income or 
assets too 
high 
Failed to 
provide 
information 
Other 
ineligibility/ 
voluntary exit 
Case income and         
benefits 
 Benefits −0.216** 
(0.013) 
−0.005 
(0.019) 
−0.064** 
(0.018) 
−0.154** 
(0.021) 
 Reported earned 
income 
0.013** (0.003) 0.087** 
(0.005) 
−0.036** 
(0.005) 
−0.049** 
(0.006) 
 Reported unearned 
income 
−0.009* (0.004) 0.087** 
(0.005) 
−0.028** 
(0.006) 
−0.041** 
(0.007) 
 No income at start of 
spell 
0.124** (0.031) 0.053 
(0.048) 
0.332** (0.043) 0.344** (0.049) 
 Any earnings at start 
of cert. period 
−0.365** 
(0.057) 
−0.273** 
(0.051) 
−0.356** 
(0.056) 
−0.423** 
(0.060) 
Previous year 
programme history 
        
 Months since closure 0.023** (0.006) 0.028** 
(0.009) 
−0.008 (0.010) 0.012 (0.012) 
 Spell closed for 
certification 
−0.010 (0.045) −0.553** 
(0.069) 
0.018 (0.067) −0.383** 
(0.085) 
 Spell closed for 
income 
−0.166 (0.063) 0.135 
(0.073) 
0.011 (0.095) −0.243* (0.113) 
 Spell closed for 
information 
−0.059 (0.060) −0.352** 
(0.084) 
0.125 (0.079) −0.392** 
(0.108) 
 Spell closed for 
other/voluntary 
−0.096 (0.081) −0.567** 
(0.128) 
0.110 (0.109) 0.418** (0.111) 
 Months since denial 0.001 (0.009) 0.001 
(0.012) 
0.006 (0.013) 0.001 (0.017) 
 App. denied for 
income 
0.047 (0.078) 0.327** 
(0.079) 
0.097 (0.107) −0.253 (0.138) 
 App. denied for 
information 
−0.028 (0.057) −0.104 
(0.076) 
−0.095 (0.078) −0.212 (0.103) 
 App. denied for −0.147 (0.092) 0.135 0.061 (0.120) 0.069 (0.135) 
other/voluntary (0.110) 
Recertification months         
 Quarterly (before 
October 2002) 
2.334** (0.085) 0.517** 
(0.087) 
0.304** (0.091) 0.114 (0.098) 
 Semi-annual (October 
2002–January 2005) 
1.275** (0.112) 0.152 
(0.147) 
0.579** (0.152) 0.206 (0.158) 
 Semi-annual (after 
January 2005) 
3.661** (0.075) 1.461** 
(0.089) 
1.289** (0.118) 0.199 (0.149) 
 Annual (before 
October 2002) 
1.089** (0.067) −0.059 
(0.192) 
0.378** (0.144) −0.873** 
(0.327) 
 Annual (October 
2002–January 2005) 
2.367** (0.103) 1.011** 
(0.180) 
−0.199 (0.162) −0.275 (0.261) 
 Earnings × quarterly 
(before October 2002) 
0.885** (0.067) 0.804** 
(0.079) 
0.428** (0.104) 0.225 (0.116) 
 Earnings × semi-ann. 
(October 2002–2005) 
2.396** (0.108) 1.538** 
(0.147) 
0.572** (0.176) 0.393 (0.208) 
 Earnings × semi-ann. 
(after January 2005) 
0.439** (0.063) 0.895** 
(0.077) 
0.751** (0.094) 0.682** (0.165) 
 Earnings × annual 
(before October 2002) 
−0.816** 
(0.077) 
−0.087 
(0.224) 
0.299* (0.147) 0.521 (0.425) 
 Earnings × annual 
(October 2002–2005) 
−2.049** 
(0.116) 
−0.939** 
(0.204) 
0.194 (0.210) −0.305 (0.401) 
Head, household 
characteristics 
        
 Female −0.368** 
(0.043) 
0.046 
(0.056) 
−0.364** 
(0.060) 
−0.084 (0.072) 
 Age spline, 18–
21 years 
−0.104** 
(0.029) 
0.221** 
(0.056) 
−0.076* (0.037) −0.145** 
(0.043) 
 Age spline, 22–
40 years 
−0.021** 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
−0.028** 
(0.004) 
−0.013** 
(0.005) 
 Age spline, 41+ years −0.027** 
(0.004) 
−0.007 
(0.005) 
−0.038** 
(0.007) 
−0.014 (0.008) 
 Education spline, 0–
12 years 
−0.021* (0.011) −0.021 
(0.017) 
0.011 (0.017) −0.020 (0.015) 
 Education spline, 12+ 
years 
0.070** (0.022) 0.133** 
(0.025) 
0.000 (0.033) 0.041 (0.038) 
 Completed high 
school 
0.042 (0.035) 0.388** 
(0.054) 
0.023 (0.051) −0.023 (0.056) 
 Completed college −0.076 (0.136) 0.060 
(0.136) 
−0.143 (0.221) 0.495* (0.205) 
 Currently married 0.164** (0.036) 0.309** 
(0.044) 
0.114* (0.052) 0.279** (0.064) 
 Formerly married 0.118** (0.030) 0.017 
(0.038) 
0.141** (0.042) 0.238** (0.050) 
 Black −0.364** 
(0.028) 
0.151** 
(0.036) 
−0.230** 
(0.039) 
−0.419** 
(0.046) 
 Other race 0.227** (0.085) 0.327** 
(0.125) 
−0.058 (0.141) 0.184 (0.134) 
 Number of children 0–
2 
−0.140** 
(0.025) 
−0.308** 
(0.035) 
0.007 (0.035) 0.182** (0.040) 
 Number of children 3–
5 
−0.045* (0.023) −0.360** 
(0.034) 
−0.058 (0.033) 0.159** (0.038) 
 Number of children 6–
11 
−0.014 (0.018) −0.321** 
(0.027) 
−0.014 (0.027) 0.149** (0.030) 
 Number of children 
12–14 
−0.009 (0.023) −0.325** 
(0.032) 
−0.046 (0.036) 0.057 (0.041) 
 Number of children 
15–17 
0.054* (0.024) −0.272** 
(0.033) 
0.010 (0.038) 0.054 (0.047) 
 Number of adults 0.072** (0.017) 0.039 
(0.023) 
0.162** (0.025) 0.049 (0.032) 
Geographic 
characteristics 
        
 County 
unemployment rate 
−0.030** 
(0.011) 
−0.036* 
(0.016) 
−0.042* (0.019) 0.012 (0.021) 
 County population 
density 
−0.135 (0.121) 0.027 
(0.171) 
−0.365 (0.204) −0.416 (0.225) 
λi (coefficients on 
unobserved factor, η) 
1.000 −0.076 
(0.083) 
0.743** (0.098) 0.258 (0.146) 
Notes: SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; App.: application; cert.: certified; 
ann.: annual; SC: South Carolina. The columns report estimated coefficients from a MNL 
competing risk hazard model of SNAP exits that was estimated jointly with a model of 
application resolutions, using SC administrative records. In addition to the listed controls, the 
competing risk hazard model included controls for the spell duration, fiscal year and county of 
residence. Huber–White SEs appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
**Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
The estimates given in the first two rows of Table 3 indicate that households are at increased risk 
of having an unsuccessful application if they have high levels of UI-covered earnings or if they 
have no record of UI-covered earnings at all. The former result is consistent with households 
being less likely to be financially eligible for SNAP benefits and thus less likely to have their 
applications accepted. The latter result, regarding no UI earnings, may be indicative of less stable 
economic circumstances or of employment that is harder to verify. 
The estimates in the next five rows of Table 3 describe the associations between households’ 
programme experiences in the preceding year and their application resolutions. The estimates 
indicate that households that are attempting to rejoin the SNAP after a short absence are more 
successful than households attempting to rejoin after longer absences or with no programme 
experience in the last year. Among the households that had experienced closures in the last year, 
closures for particular reasons were associated with application denials. 
The associations between previous and current application outcomes are both weaker and more 
varied than the associations between previous closures and current application outcomes. For 
example, a previous application denial due to financial eligibility reasons significantly increases 
the chances of a subsequent financial ineligibility denial, but previous denials due to information 
reasons decrease the chances of such a denial reoccurring. 
Demographic characteristics are also associated with application resolutions. Very young 
applicants have relatively high risks of information-related denials and ‘other’ denials. The risks 
of an information-related denial generally decrease with age up to 40 years. Additional years of 
elementary and secondary schooling reduce the chances of an unsuccessful application; however, 
earning a high school diploma or general equivalency degree increases those chances. Married 
applicants are more likely to have their applications denied for financial and information reasons. 
Households with more children, especially young children, are less likely to have applications 
denied, but households with more adults are more likely to have applications denied. 
Application resolutions also differ depending on local conditions. Households in counties with 
high unemployment are less likely than households in other areas to withdraw their applications 
or have them denied for ‘other’ reasons, and households that apply from more densely populated 
counties are more successful than those who apply from less populated counties. 
The last row of Table 3 lists the estimates of the coefficients (factor loadings) for the time-
invariant unobserved household characteristic, η, which enters both the application resolution 
model and the competing risk hazard model. Identification of the coefficients on η requires that 
one coefficient in one of the models be set equal to one. We normalized the coefficients in terms 
of characteristics that cause households to leave the SNAP because of missed recertifications 
(set λ1 in Equation 2 equal to 1). The estimates from Table 3 indicate that unobserved 
characteristics that cause households to miss their recertifications are positively associated with 
households having their applications denied because of information problems but negatively 
associated with households having the applications denied for financial ineligibility. The 
estimates also provide some evidence that programme spells are subject to selection on the basis 
of unobservables. 
MNL coefficient estimates from the discrete time, competing risk hazard models of SNAP 
participation spells are reported in Table 4. From left to right, the coefficients are from the MNL 
latent indices for exits due to missed recertifications, financial ineligibility, information 
problems, and other types of ineligibility and withdrawals. 
The first five rows list coefficients on the household benefit and income variables. Higher SNAP 
benefits are estimated to reduce the risks of exit due to recertifications, information reasons and 
other/voluntary reasons. The results are generally consistent with higher benefits providing 
incentives to comply with programme rules and encouraging programme participation. Higher 
levels of earnings are estimated to increase the chances of missing a recertification or becoming 
financially ineligible but to decrease the chances of exiting for information problems or ‘other’ 
reasons. Higher levels of unearned income have similar effects, except that they are estimated to 
reduce the risk of missing a recertification. Households that begin their SNAP spells with no 
income whatsoever have higher rates of exit compared to other households, while households 
that have some earnings have lower risks of exit. 
The next five rows list coefficients for households’ programme experiences during the year 
preceding their current SNAP spell. Households that recently had a SNAP case closed for 
financial ineligibility are estimated to be at increased risk of having their current cases closed for 
the same reason, and households that had earlier SNAP cases closed because of missed 
recertifications, information problems, or other problems are at lower risk of having their current 
cases closed for financial reasons. A similar pattern appears for ‘other’ closures – a recent 
experience with the same type of closure increases the risks of an ‘other’ closure, but a recent 
experience with a missed recertification, a loss of financial eligibility or an information problem 
decreases the risks. 
The next four rows list coefficients for prior application experiences. Households that had earlier 
applications turned down because of financial ineligibility are estimated to face higher risks of 
having their cases closed for financial reasons. Other application experiences are not 
significantly associated with programme tenure. 
The next 10 rows list coefficient estimates for the controls regarding likely recertification months 
within spells for households with and without earnings at the start of their certification periods. 
The estimates indicate that households were more likely to leave the SNAP in months when 
recertifications were due than in other months. Households with earnings were especially likely 
to leave at the short interval dates (quarterly before October 2002 and semi-annually after that), 
while households without earnings were especially likely to leave at the long interval dates 
(annually before February 2005). At their recertification dates, households were at a substantially 
higher risk of leaving the SNAP because of a missed recertification and also at increased risk of 
leaving for other reasons, including financial ineligibility. 
The estimates from Table 4 also reveal that cases headed by women were generally less likely to 
exit than cases headed by men. The risks of missing a recertification or failing to provide 
information decreased with the household head’s age, but the risks of exiting due to financial 
reasons increased. Being currently or formally married generally increased the risks of exiting 
the SNAP. Increases in the number of children were generally negatively related to exits for 
missed recertifications and financial ineligibility but positively related to ‘other’ exits. Greater 
numbers of adults were positively related to most types of exits. 
The last row in Table 4 lists coefficients on the unobserved factor, η. The estimates indicate that 
unobserved characteristics that increase the chances of a missed recertification also increase the 
chances of a case closure for information problems or of a closure for other reasons. The patterns 
of coefficients from these models and the application resolution models are consistent with 
positive selection. Specifically, unobserved characteristics that contribute to information 
problems in applications also contribute to information problems in subsequent participation 
spells. 
V. Conclusion 
In this article, we have used longitudinal, household-level records from SC’s SNAP to 
investigate how applications to the programme are resolved and how resulting participation 
spells end. Application resolutions have been mostly overlooked by previous studies, and no 
study has jointly examined application outcomes and participation spells. 
Nationally, only about three quarters of households that appear to be eligible for the SNAP 
actually receive benefits under the programme. Difficulties completing applications, supplying 
documentation and providing continuing information could contribute to this lack of take-up. In 
our sample of SNAP applications, approximately one third were rejected or otherwise 
unsuccessful. Some of the rejected applications came from households that were determined to 
be financially ineligible, but most (about five out of every nine applications that were rejected) 
were turned down because of incomplete or insufficient information. Similarly, when we 
examine why SNAP spells end, roughly half of households stop receiving benefits because they 
fail to recertify and another sixth lose benefits because of incomplete or insufficient information. 
Only a fifth of households stop receiving benefits because of a formal determination of financial 
ineligibility. 
Completing paperwork takes some effort and motivation. Undoubtedly, some households fail to 
undertake these efforts because they recognize that they are financially ineligible. However, it 
does not appear that financial ineligibility was the root cause of all of these outcomes. Indeed, 
households that had applications rejected for incomplete information had substantially lower 
amounts of UI-covered earnings than households with successful applications. Along the same 
lines, households that had their SNAP participation spells closed because of information 
deficiencies had higher average programme benefits and lower average income levels than other 
households. 
Estimates from our multivariate models indicate that households’ resources and needs are 
associated with both application resolutions and subsequent participation spells, mostly in ways 
that we would expect. Other things held constant, we observe that households with higher 
earnings are more likely to have their SNAP applications rejected than households with lower 
earnings, especially for reasons of financial ineligibility. At the same time, households with more 
children (greater needs) are less likely to have their applications rejected. SNAP participants with 
higher levels of earnings are more likely than other participants to have their cases closed 
because of financial ineligibility and missed recertifications. However, higher earnings are 
associated with lower rates of exit for information problems and other reasons. Having more 
children in the household reduces the risk of a participation spell ending for eligibility reasons 
but increases the risk of a spell ending for some other reasons. 
SNAP participants with higher benefits are less likely than other households to miss their 
recertifications, to provide incomplete or insufficient information or have spells end for other 
reasons. These associations appear even after controlling for resources and needs, suggesting that 
the benefit itself provides an incentive to comply with the programme rules. 
The novel elements of our article involve examining and finding evidence of how households’ 
application and participation histories are associated with their application and programme spell 
outcomes. Estimates from the multivariate models indicate that unobservable characteristics 
account for some of these associations. The results are consistent with positive selection in the 
sense that unobserved characteristics that contribute to one type of outcome at one time, such as 
an information problem with an application or participation spell, contribute to similar problems 
at other times. However, we also find that households’ earlier SNAP application and 
participation experiences are predictive of their later experiences, even after controlling for other 
observable and unobservable characteristics. We find that applicants that have recently 
completed a participation spell are more likely to be successful in their applications than other 
applicants. This direct association could come about if participating households gain experience 
and familiarity with SNAP rules and procedures. 
Among the applicants with recent programme experience, the way in which a previous spell ends 
partly predicts how their next application will be resolved and how their next participation spell 
will end. Households face an increased risk of having a SNAP participation spell end for 
financial ineligibility if an earlier spell ended for that reason. Similarly, households face an 
increased risk of having their applications denied or participation spells end for information 
deficiencies if an earlier spell ended that way. Thus, while programme experience may provide 
some general information about procedures, specific aspects of these procedures still cause some 
clients repeated problems. 
These findings suggest ways that SNAP administrators and caseworkers might better target their 
assistance. New applicants seem to be especially prone to application denials and case closures. 
Also, applicants and clients who have experienced particular types of denials and case closures 
appear to be at high risk of repeating those behaviours. These aspects of programme experience 
are available through automated records and could, in principle, be shown to caseworkers as 
soon as a household applies. Households that appear to be at high risk for an unsuccessful 
programme outcome could receive more information, more assistance at intake and more follow-
up opportunities. 
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Notes 
1 The Food Stamp Program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program on 1 
October 2008. 
2 Adult-only cases and cases with elderly recipients face different rules than other cases. 
Notes: UI: Unemployment Insurance; App.: application; SC: South Carolina. Authors’ 
calculations from SC administrative records. The asterisks indicate significant differences 
between means of applicant characteristics whose applications were approved from those whose 
applications were not. 
*Differences significant at 0.05 level. 
**Differences are significant at 0.01 level. 
Notes: App.: application; SC: South Carolina; elig.: eligibility; vol.: voluntary withdrawal. 
Authors’ calculations from SC administrative records. The asterisks indicate significant 
differences between means in characteristics of participants whose spells were censored from 
those whose spells terminated. 
*Differences significant at 0.05 level. 
**Differences significant at 0.01 level. 
3 Complete, detailed results are available upon request. 
Notes: SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; UI: Unemployment Insurance; 
Appl.: application; SC: South Carolina; vol.: voluntary. The columns report estimated 
coefficients from a MNL model of application resolutions that was estimated jointly with a 
competing risk hazard model of SNAP exits, using SC administrative records. In addition to the 
listed controls, the application resolution model included controls for fiscal year and county of 
residence. Huber–White SEs appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
**Significant at 0.01 level. 
Notes: SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; App.: application; cert.: certified; 
ann.: annual; SC: South Carolina. The columns report estimated coefficients from a MNL 
competing risk hazard model of SNAP exits that was estimated jointly with a model of 
application resolutions, using SC administrative records. In addition to the listed controls, the 
competing risk hazard model included controls for the spell duration, fiscal year and county of 
residence. Huber–White SEs appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
**Significant at 0.01 level. 
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